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Abstract: We investigate whether trade has any effect on the price formation process in a 
specific electricity market, and identify interconnected markets that have higher impacts on 
prices in that market. In particular, we study Ontario wholesale electricity market and its 
trade  with  12  interconnected  markets  including  New  York,  Michigan,  and  Minnesota 
markets. We find that imports are unambiguously related to prices, while exports are not. 
Furthermore, imports have a positive and significant relationship with prices. We argue that 
the  results  are  associated  with  auction  design,  production  constraints,  and  technological 
differences. Out of the 12 studied interties, only three have a significant impact on price, two 
of which are the largest ones. 
  
Keywords: electricity trade; simultaneous trade; transmission network; electricity prices; non-
linear Granger causality; Ontario, New York, Michigan, Manitoba, Quebec wholesale 
electricity markets. 




*    We  thank  Thanasis  Stengos  for  helpful  comments.  The  first  author  is  the  corresponding  author,  who 
acknowledges  research  support  from  the  Social  Sciences  and  Humanities  Council  of  Canada.  Email: 




1.   Introduction  
Evolution  of electricity markets  since  the  restructuring  process  throughout  the  world  has 
produced fruitful results especially in the production and transmission sides of the industry. 
Competitive market designs along with applicable market rules, efficient auction institutions, 
and welfare improving transactions have radically changed the wholesale electricity markets. 
Moreover,  open  access  in  transmission  has  entailed  more  flow  of  electricity  across 
interconnected jurisdictions.  
One of the aims of the deregulation of electricity markets is to increase welfare, notably by 
reducing significant price differentials between states/provinces. To facilitate this, electricity 
is traded among neighbouring jurisdictions through networks. Exports and imports, in theory, 
should  minimize  price  differentials  in  the  presence  of  no  network  externalities  and  no 
transmission  capacity  constraints.  However,  these  constraints  always  exist  in  electricity 
networks. Accordingly, we investigate whether trade has any effect on the price formation 
process in an electricity market, and then we examine which interconnected markets may 
have more influence in the price formation of that specific market. In particular, we study 
Ontario wholesale electricity market and its trade with twelve interconnected markets and 
submarkets within the network.  
Many studies have analyzed restructured electricity markets; however, interregional trades in 
interconnected electricity markets and their effects on market prices have been ignored. This 
is an important issue, because it can have significant impact on market prices, and therefore 
on generation and transmission investments not only within a jurisdiction but also outside. 
Furthermore, as electricity market integration between jurisdictions progresses, more trade is 
expected. Trade effects should be well understood not only for the political economy of the 
sector  but  also  to  foresee  the  evolution  of  investment  in  production  and  transmission 
capacities. 
Electricity has been auctioned in wholesale electricity markets in many parts of the world. In 
the electricity auctions (uniform-price or discriminatory) the last accepted energy offer sets 
the market price (which is paid to all suppliers in the uniform-price auction, and only paid to 
the market clearing supplier in the discriminatory auction). As this last accepted energy offer 
can come from a local generator or from a wholesaler importing electricity, the market price 
can be set from outside the home market. For example, in the New York electricity market 
(NYISO) and the Midwest electricity market (MISO) exporters and importers can set the 2 
 
market clearing price in the day-ahead market. The Ontario market (IESO) allows exports 
and imports to set the pre-dispatch price one hour before the delivery during the pre-dispatch 
sequence, and these export and import quantities can be scheduled in the real-time.  In many 
commodities markets, imports tend to reduce the product price at home market. A similar 
argument is claimed for electricity markets, that is, the presence of imports may lower the 
market price by making more energy available at a given time, avoiding the need to accept 
higher energy offers from the home market. Similarly, exports (energy bids from out-of-state 
players) may increase the market price, as expensive energy offers have to be accepted to 
meet demand faced by the local market. We will test this claim in this paper, and find that 
this claim may not hold true in general.   
We in particular examine the role of trades (exports and imports) in the wholesale electricity 
market  price  formation  process  in  Ontario,  the  largest  province  of  Canada  in  terms  of 
population and economy. The Ontario market has peculiar features;  connecting  regulated 
markets to deregulated markets via transmission grid and having the most volatile market in 
its transmission network. Ontario has two main physical markets: the real-time energy market 
and the real-time operating market. Contrary to the US electricity markets, it does not have a 
day-ahead market: market prices are settled every 5 minutes in real-time, not one day in 
advance.  Its market price volatility is higher than the ones in neighbouring jurisdictions such 
as  New  England  (NE),  New  York  (NY)  and  Pennsylvania-New  Jersey-Maryland 
Interconnection (PJM). These markets have the two-settlement markets (day-ahead and real-
time markets) in which most of the real-time demand is cleared in the day-ahead market (for 
instance, on average 97% for the NE market, 90% for the NY market in 2004, according to 
Zareipour et al., 2007). The high volatility in Ontario market is argued to be correlated with 
the single-settlement nature of the market that is the real-time balancing market. 
In the best of our knowledge this is the first paper analyzing the effects of trade on electricity 
market price formation process. This research has implications on integration of electricity 
markets,  and  possible  investments  in  transmission  and  production  capacity,  also  gives 
guidance  on  determining  trading  zones  which  are  more  important  than  the  others  in  the 
network.  
There are several  papers in the literature  that examined the Ontario wholesale electricity 
market.  These  papers  studied  production  capacity  investments  (Genc  and  Sen,  2008), 
identification of variables explaining peak price (Rueda and Marathe, 2005), measuring price 3 
 
volatility (Zareipour et al., 2007), and the effects of power outages on prices (Melino and 
Peerbocus, 2008) in the Ontario market. These studies, among others, have not considered the 
likely effects of trade on market prices. An exception is Serletis and Dormaar (2007) who 
examine whether exports and imports cause changes in Alberta market prices. We, however, 
take advantage of an extensive data set and use recently developed non-linear causality tests, 
in addition to linear ones, to determine trade effects on Ontario prices.  With high frequency 
export and  import data, we also  pinpoint the neighbouring jurisdictions that significantly 
affect the Ontario prices through energy trading in the transmission network.  
To our knowledge there is no an established trade theory for electricity. This may stem from 
peculiarities associated with electricity. Electricity demand should be continuously met to 
avoid power cuts (e.g., brownouts and blackouts), which harm the economy. Unlike other 
goods,  electricity  can  be  instantly  transmitted  from  an  injection  point  (or  a  production 
location)  to  an  end-user.  Hence,  it  is  not  subject  to  any  delay  in  transportation  process 
(electrons move at the speed of light). Other goods can be stored at least for some time. 
However, electricity is either very expensive to store or impossible to store even at a modest 
scale. If it is generated and transmission lines do not have enough capacity to carry a certain 
MWh power, it should be dumped to the earth near its generation location. Thus, sometimes 
prices for this surplus production are negative. If this excess amount of electricity is not 
withdrawn from the grid, it may cause network system-wide collapse, leading to blackouts.    
Virtually  all  trade  theories  (Ricardian,  Heckscher-Ohlin,  etc.)  explain  price  differentials 
among autarky markets and trade effects on income distribution and welfare, and predict that 
goods will flow from low price markets to high price markets. However, these theories may 
fall short in explaining dynamics of trade in electricity markets due to the peculiarities of 
electricity and the constantly changing supply and demand conditions at every moment in 
time.  Moreover,  trading  electricity  between  jurisdictions  is  limited  by  transmission  line 
capacity and is subject to interventions by system operators. It can even happen that, due to 
hedging purpose and market rule differences between jurisdictions, exports and imports of 
electricity could occur simultaneously within a given trading period. In the Ontario market, 
this type of simultaneous trade (import of energy into Ontario and export of energy from 
Ontario) is called a wheeling-through transaction.       4 
 
Our Ontario study uses hourly data from  2002 to  2009, in a  context where imports and 
exports  are  made  with  five  different  jurisdictions  (New  York,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
Manitoba and Quebec), interconnected through 12 trading zones. 
We make several contributions in this paper. This is the first paper examining a transmission 
network to analyze trade effects. Moreover, we use an extensive data set applying recently 
developed non-linear causality tests to determine whether exports and/or imports cause price 
formation  process  in  a  local  market.  In  addition,  we  determine  the  main  trading 
zones/markets that have more influence on prices than others in that local market. Our main 
findings are the following. First, we find that while Ontario imports can be unambiguously 
tied to the hourly Ontario energy price, exports cannot. We find Granger causality for all lags 
in the case of imports by utilizing linear and non-linear tests. Second, in the aggregate data 
we observe positive relationship between imports and prices. In the disaggregated data, by 
making use  of an extensive database, we  obtain a  unique evidence  that imports have an 
influence on prices in hourly basis, even if only a limited number of intertie have a significant 
impact. Third, we observe low capacity utilization rates and significant trade activities during 
trading periods.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The following section describes the structure of the 
Ontario market and the interconnecting markets. The third section explains the data set, the 
methodology,  and  some  results.  The  fourth  section  quantifies  the  relationship  between 
imports  and  prices.  Fifth,  using  disaggregated  data  of  imports  neighbouring  jurisdictions 
affecting the Ontario prices are analyzed. Finally, conclusions are presented. 
 
2.   The Ontario Electricity Market and its Interconnections 
In this section we describe the advancement of the reform process in the Ontario electricity 
industry, the structure of the wholesale electricity market and the intertie zones in which 
Ontario trades electricity.  
The Ontario wholesale electricity market has many interesting features. It has a diversified 
generation  portfolio,  with  all  types  of  production  technologies  (fossil-fuelled,  nuclear, 
hydropower and some other renewable technologies). It is also the most volatile market in the 
region (as established by Zareipour et al., 2007). Along with the Alberta market, Ontario 
market is the only market having a one settlement market which is the real-time spot market 5 
 
in North America. Indeed, neighbouring jurisdictions to Ontario and other deregulated US 
electricity markets have both a day-ahead market and a real-time balancing market. 
The reform framework of the Ontario electricity industry was largely established in the 1996 
“Macdonald Report” (Macdonald et al., 1996).
1 Following recommendations made in this 
report, an Independent Electricity Market Operator (IEMO) was created in 1998. The IEMO 
became in charge of system operations and of the wholesale market. In 1999, as the result of 
the 1998 Energy Competition Act, the regulated monopoly Ontario Hydro was split into a 
large generation company (Ontario Power Generation, OPG), and a transmission company 
(Hydro  One)  with  a  significant  distribution  business.  Both  companies  remained 
governmentally owned. The Ontario spot market started its operations in May 2002, with 
hourly energy offers received from all generators. However, the generation market is still 
dominated by OPG, which produced 66% of the 158 TWh generated in 2007 in Ontario 
(Statistics Canada, 2009 and OPG, 2007). 
Soon after the start of the spot market, due to significant price increases, a retail price cap 
was  established  in  November  2002  (Electricity  Pricing,  Conservation  and  Supply  Act). 
Although the wholesale spot market continued its operation as initially planned, the retail 
consumers  have  seen  their  electricity  price  re-regulated  further  in  2003  (Ontario  Energy 
Board Amendment Act - Electricity Pricing). This regulation guaranteed a fixed price for 
some end-users (e.g., small businesses and residential customers). In 2005, this approach 
became the “Regulated Price Plan” that most retail consumers still subscribe to (alternatively, 
small consumers can opt for a retail contract, freely negotiated with an electricity retailer). 
As concerns over electricity prices and adequacy of investment grew, the 2004 Electricity 
Restructuring Act re-introduced long-term planning with a new institution, the Ontario Power 
Authority  (OPA).  The  IEMO  also  changed  its  name  to  Independent  Electricity  System 
Operator (IESO). Under this act, OPG is mandated to sell some of its hydro production and 
all of its nuclear production (from designated “Prescribed Generation Assets”) at a regulated 
price. In 2007, 62.3 TWh from OPG (almost 60% of its production) was sold at a regulated 
price to some end-user consumers (OPG, 2007). However, the wholesale market continues to 
operate on freely set energy offers (even for the OPG prescribed generation assets), with the 
IESO selecting the cheapest energy offers to meet demand. An Hourly Ontario Energy Price 
                                                              
1 More details about the history and the current market structure of the Ontario electricity market can be found 
in EDA (2007), which is the main reference for this section. 6 
 
(HOEP) is set through a uniform price auction. This HOEP is actually the average value of 
the twelve 5-minutes market clearing prices of a specific hour. 
Price  regulation  for  retail  consumers  and  for  OPG  comes  as  a  retroactive  accounting 
adjustment. This dual system preserves an operating spot market with some price stability for 
retail consumers, but creates some additional administrative and accounting procedures to 
monitor and adjust prices on a regular basis (so that market and regulated prices balance with 
actual payments made by consumers). 
Along with the main regulator (the Ontario Energy Board (OEB)), the Ontario market has the 
following  registered  market  players  (OEB,  2008):  electricity  generators,  electricity 
distributors, electricity transmitters, electricity wholesalers, and electricity retailers. 
The Ontario wholesale electricity market consists of energy market, operating reserves and 
financial  transmission  rights  market.  The  IESO  issues  dispatch  instructions  to  loads  and 
generators, and runs the uniform price auction for each five minute interval of every day. The 
spot market price is set by simply ranking all received energy offers (from generators and 
wholesalers/importers) in increasing price order, until the forecasted demand is satisfied. The 
last accepted energy offer sets the market price, which is paid to all suppliers (IESO, 2009d).  
The  IESO  governs  the  wholesale  market,  ensures  the  reliability  of  the  integrated  power 
system, and forecasts supply requirements and demand (total Ontario market demand is equal 
to  domestic  demand  plus  export  demand).  Suppliers  submit  energy  offer  (quantity-price 
pairs) to sell electricity and wholesale buyers submit energy bids to buy electricity. The IESO 
runs a uniform price auction to balance total market supply and demand and establish the 
Hourly  Ontario  Energy  Price  (HOEP),  which  is  the  price  paid  to  generators  that  supply 
power.  Indeed, the market clearing price (MCP) is calculated every five minutes a day and 
the average of these MCP prices results in the HOEP, which is also known as spot price.   
Although the price elasticity of total demand is low, some large wholesale customers are able 
to respond to changes in prices by either shifting some of their demand to off-peak periods or 
participating in the market and bidding how much electricity they plan to consume at what 
price.
2  
                                                              
2 According to IESO 2010 market’s program (www.ieso.ca), there are 13 facilities operating as “dispatchable 
load” in the market, offering 700 MW of potential demand response. 7 
 
The IESO does not have a day-ahead market due to regulatory reasons. Generation dispatch 
and market clearing prices are set in the real-time energy market. However, for reliability 
purpose,  the  IESO  has  a  Day-Ahead  Commitment  Process  (DACP),  created  in  2006,  to 
manage day-ahead available energy units and determine approximate import transactions.
3 
On  the  other  hand,  neighbouring  jurisdictions  have  two-settlement  markets,  namely  day- 
ahead  and  real-time  energy  markets.  Day-ahead  market  has  the  dominant  share  of 
transactions in the neighbouring US markets. The two-settlement market structure enables 
that most of the market demand is cleared a day before market opens and generators have 
enough time to adjust their operations for the instances of unpredictable events in real-time.  
 
Table 1 presents the available generation capacity within Ontario in 2009. This capacity has 
grown at an average rate of 2% during the period 2002-2009 (Statistics Canada, 2009), while 
the total energy made available (generation plus imports, minus exports) has stayed at the 
same level from 2002 to 2009, at about 155 TWh per year. 






Nuclear  11,426  32.2% 
Hydroelectric  7,911  22.3% 
Coal  6,434  18.1% 
Oil / Gas  8,535  24.1% 
Wind  1,084  3.1% 
Biomass / Landfill Gas  75  0.2% 
Total  35,465   
 
As noted by Zareipoura et al. (2007), coal-fired generators are the most-frequent market price 
setters in Ontario, while gas-fired generators are the price setters only during extreme demand 
hours in a day. 
                                                              
3 In 2008 the IESO Board approved the implementation  of an Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process 
(EDAC) to deliver some minor changes to the existing Day-Ahead Commitment Process. 8 
 
2.1. Export and Import Structure in the Ontario Market 
Ontario power network has interconnections with two Canadian regulated markets (Manitoba 
and Quebec) and three deregulated US markets (Minnesota, Michigan and New York) as 
shown in Figure 1. The capacity of each interconnection is presented in Table 2, although the 
total actual export/import capacity is not the arithmetic sum of individual capacities. Due to 
some  network  constraints,  the  cumulative  export/import  capacity  is  actually  closer  to 
4,000 MW (IESO, 2009c). In Table 2, exports (imports) column represents the maximum 
exports (imports) quantities from (to) Ontario to (from) the interconnection. For instance, on 
a given hour, Ontario can sell to NY up to 1,925 MWh, or can import at most 1,680 MWh of 
energy from NY.  
 






Table 2. Ontario Interconnection Capacity for Exports and Imports, in MW, 2009 
(IESO, 2009b)  
  Exports  Imports 
Manitoba  268  336 
Minnesota  140  90 
Michigan  2,275  1,675 
New York  1,925  1,680 
Quebec  1,329  2,210 
Total  5,937  5,991 
 
Except for a 625 MW addition to the Quebec interconnection in July 2009, interconnection 
capacities  remain  very  stable  from  2002  to  2009.  Detailed  individual  transmission  line 
information is published many times a year by the IESO (see IESO, 2009b). In Table 2 the 
export and imports capacities are about 6,000 MWh which is very significant because it may 
cover almost one third of the average load in Ontario. However, these transactions are subject 
to transmission and network constraints and availability of generation units.  
Producers can sell at the real-time spot market price (known as Hourly Ontario Energy Price, 
HOEP) or can sell their production to other external markets. A home generator can export 
directly to other markets without participating in the home market. That is, it can submit 
energy offers in other markets, before offering its energy to the Ontario market. Therefore, an 
Ontario generator can export while having no sales in Ontario. However, even though the 
exports  are  already  scheduled,  the  system  operator  may  recall  or  curtail  some  export 
transactions for system adequacy or reliability reasons. Importers of electric power are given 
price guarantee for the energy they bring into the market. If the spot price is lower than the 
pre-dispatch accepted price of the importer, the difference is paid by the operator to the 
importer.  To  signal  market  conditions,  the  IESO  releases  pre-dispatch  schedules  with 
forecasted  demand  and  supply  requirements  (e.g.,  generation  availability,  imports  and 
exports) along with price signals (e.g., projected HOEP for the day, intertie offer guarantee 
estimate). Importers use these market signals before placing their bids. Due to unexpected 
outages, even if there is available capacity in Ontario, the home market price may increase 
which may create a trade opportunity for importers. This could, for instance, be explained by 10 
 
high ramping rates of power plants and/or low spinning reserve capacity. Depending on the 
price  differential  between  the  home  market  and  interconnected  markets,  and  on  the 
transmission constraints, importers may benefit from arbitrage opportunities. 
Currently, IESO employs “Dispatch Scheduling and Optimization Algorithm” to determine 
pre-dispatch sequence of prices and load for the future periods. These are predicted prices for 
the forecasted demand. The algorithm is run every hour, and the pre-dispatch prices and 
quantities calculated for each hour for the future 12-36 hours are published at the IESO web 
site
4. Specifically, market participants use the pre-dispatch data to reform their operations 
planning and participation in the (real-time) market. For example, when the 3-hour ahead pre-
dispatch price is above $120, if the market participants reduce their demand in real-time then 
the IESO compensates them to increase price responsiveness.  
Imports and exports are scheduled one-hour before the delivery hour given that they have 
submitted their bids in the pre-dispatch scheduling, and imports have offered below the hour-
ahead  pre-dispatch  price,  and  exports  have  bid  above  the  hour-ahead  pre-dispatch  price. 
Imports and exports are settled in the real time at the sum of the real-time market clearing 
price  and  the  congestion  price  determined  during  the  hour-ahead  pre-dispatch  sequence. 
Importers are given a price guarantee so that if the real-time market price is lower than their 
bid price in the hour-ahead pre-dispatch they will be paid at least the average price of their 
bids. Therefore, pre-dispatch prices are crucial for payments to importers. Pre-dispatch prices 
also help form finalizing future import offers.  
From the operations in the hour-ahead dispatch planning and the market clearing in the real-
time market, it is clear that imports and exports can potentially affect the real-time prices. 
Imports offered below the hour-ahead pre-dispatch price and exports bid above the hour-
ahead  pre-dispatch  price  are  all  scheduled  in  real-time  dispatch  with  sure  probability. 
Therefore,  exports  and imports  will  play  an  important  role  in  determination  of  real-time 
market prices. Nevertheless, they do not set the market clearing price in real time as they 
cannot be dispatched in every five minutes. In Ontario, imports and exports can set the pre-
dispatch price in the hour-ahead market. However, intertie transactions (exports and imports) 
in the neighbouring jurisdictions such as MISO (Midwest ISO) and NYISO that have day-
ahead markets can set the market prices ahead of the day.    
                                                              
4  The pre-dispatch prices and quantities are posted at www.theimo.com/imoweb/marketdata/marketToday.asp 11 
 
It is argued by the “market pricing working group” in the IESO that pre-dispatch prices 
would approach to the real-time prices if the pre-dispatch prices would be determined 5-
minute ahead of the real-time auction instead of the hour-ahead operations.
5 The IESO is 
about to design a day-ahead market which will aim to set electricity prices on an hourly basis 
one-day ahead of the real-time.
6 In the planned day-ahead market design imports and exports 
will be able to set the day-ahead market prices. The real-time market, however, will remain 
effective and run the auction in five-minute basis to clear the unmet demand.   
3.   Data, Methodology and Some Results 
Below we explain the data set and the econometric approach we use to assess the relationship 
between trade and market prices. In particular, we investigate causality between trade and 
market prices in this section. We employ linear and recently developed non-linear Granger 
causality tests from export and import volumes to electricity prices during on-peak, off-peak 
and all times periods. We will provide our causality results in this section. Further results on 
the effects of trading activities on market prices will follow in the next sections. 
3.1   Data 
Our data set include electricity prices, export and import volumes and total market demand. 
They span the time period of May 1, 2002 – June 9, 2009 on hourly basis, including all week 
and weekend days (62,328 data points for each variable).  
We also analyze this data set in subcategories as peak and off-peak hours. Peak time data are 
defined as the hours between 08:00 and 22:00 (including 8.00 and 22:00) during week days 
and excluding whole weekends (27,825 data points for each variable). Off-peak time data 
includes week day’s hours between 23:00 -07:00 and whole weekends (34,503 data points for 
each variable). See the Appendix for summary descriptive statistics on hourly imports (M), 
exports (X), total quantity demanded (Q) and price (P). 
3.2   Testing Granger Causality and Some Results 
                                                              
5 See http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2004Aug20_ISS01_PreDispPrice.pdf 
and the Issue 30 on forecast of real-time price.  
 
6 See http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-Issue7-Imports-Exports-
Setting-Price.pdf. The day-head market has not been implemented by IESO yet.  
 12 
 
In this section, we test the Granger-causality from export and import volumes to electricity 
prices. The conventional approach of testing Granger-causality is to assume a parametric, 
linear time series model for the conditional mean and test whether the lags of one variable 
enter into the equation for another variable. However, as we explain in Section 3.3, the linear 
test statistics may not be sufficient to detect nonlinear effects on the conditional distribution. 
As a first step we perform conventional linear Granger-causality tests, and then we extend 
our analysis in the following section by running recently developed nonlinear tests.  
In the linear framework, it is a common practice to test the Granger-causality within a Vector 
Autoregressive  (VAR)  model  using  Wald  (or  F)  criteria  that  are  considered  to  be 
asymptotically  chi-squared,  as  indeed  they  are  in  stationary  or  trend  stationary  systems. 
However,  as  now  well  understood  (see  Toda  and  Phillips,  1993,  among  others)  the 
asymptotic theory of Wald tests is typically much more complex in systems that involve 
variables with stochastic trends. The first issue is that whether there are common stochastic 
trends among the variables in the VAR. Therefore, one has to test for cointegration first, if 
there is no evidence on cointegration a VAR on first differenced series would be appropriate 
and, given the fact that all series are integrated with order 1, I(1), Wald test is asymptotically 
chi-squared distributed. Should there be evidence on cointegration, one may use either the 
procedure in Toda and Phillips (1993) or Augmented Wald (A-Wald) test proposed by Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Luktepohl (1996)
7. Both Toda and Yamamoto and 
Dolado and Luktepohl proved that in integrated and cointegrated systems the Wald test for 
linear restrictions on the parameters of a VAR(p) has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution 
when a VAR(p+dmax) is estimated, where p is the true lag order of the VAR and dmax is the 
maximum order of integration in the system. 
Since the Augmented Wald test is indifferent whether the series in VAR are cointegrated or 
not, or whether they are I(0) or I(1), or mixed, to avoid pre-testing biases (either in unit root 
or cointegration tests) one can directly use this procedure without embarking on problematic 
unit root or cointegration tests. Hence, we use this approach to test the presence of (linear) 
Granger-causality from export and import volumes to electricity prices. In short, this testing 
procedure simply involves augmenting the underlying VAR in levels by extra lags that equal 
to  dmax  and  performing  the  usual  Wald  test  for  the  non-causality  restrictions  in  the  non 
augmented VAR.  
                                                              
7 We recommend  Luktepohl  (2006, section 7.6.3) for a textbook treatment of this test. 13 
 
Serletis  and  Dormaar  (2007)  assume  four-variable  VARs  for  Alberta  market.  Rueda and 
Marathe (2005) use support-vector-machine-based learning algorithm for sensitivity analysis 
to find the main determinants of real-time Ontario average peak price. They find that the 
main explanatory variables of the peak prices are lagged average peak price, the actual import 
peak volume, the peak Ontario market load, and net available supply after accounting for load 
(excess supply) for the data studied in the period May 2002- May 2003. Due to these reasons 
we estimate four-variable VARs for the Ontario market. The variables included in VARs 
consist of electricity prices, export and import volumes and total demand (load). We tested 
the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality by restricting the relevant coefficients to zero in 
the following equation of the VAR(p+dmax) model. 
(1) 
max max max max
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
p d p d p d p d
p
t i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i
P t P X M Q u α β φ ϕ ψ γ
+ + + +
− − − − − − − −
= = = =
= + + + + + + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
where  t P,  t X ,  t M ,  t Q  stand, respectively, for price, export, import and total demand at hour 
t, and 
p
t u  represent the usual error term of the price equation of VAR. In this equation, the 
null of “export does not granger cause to power prices” and the null of “import does not 
granger  cause  to  power  prices”  are  tested  by  using  following  restrictions: 
0 1 2 : .... 0 p H ϕ ϕ ϕ = = =  and  0 1 2 : .... 0 p H ψ ψ ψ = = = , respectively. 
To determine dmax in our four-variable system, we use standard ADF tests that have the null 
hypothesis  of  non-stationary.  Table  3  displays  the  results  of  ADF  tests  in  which  the 
underlying lag length of the test is selected by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
8 over the 
maximum of 360 lags
9. 
Table 3. Unit Root Tests 
  M  X  Q  P 
ADF  -5.45393**  -5.02739**  -5.70100**  -6.49798** 
 ote: The table shows test statistics for the unit-root hypothesis of ADF(p) where p is the number of lags 
determined by Akaike Information Criteria. The tests in levels include an intercept and trend term. (*), and (**) 
rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 and 5 percent significance levels. 
 
                                                              
8 The usage of other criteria  such as SBC and HQC yield the similar  results. 
9 We only use the all-hours data for unit root testing for which 360 lags correspond to a period of 15 days. 14 
 
A consequence of results shown in of Table 3 is that all variables are stationary, hence we 
identify dmax = 0, according to ADF tests. Nevertheless, since low-power of these tests is well 
known, we proceed by  reporting both classic and Augmented Wald tests as a robustness 
check. In Augmented tests we assume dmax is equal to 1 to take into account at least one 
possible unit root in the system, which cannot be detected by ADF tests. 
Table 4 displays the results of the linear Granger-causality tests. Panel I of Table 4 illustrates 
the test statistics obtained by using the data resulted from all hours. Panel II and III do the 
same for off-peak and peak hours. Since the result of the Granger-causality tests can critically 
depend on the choice of lag length underlying VAR, we estimate all VARs up to a maximum 
number of lags. For each case, the maximum lag length p in Equation (1) is determined by 
the number of hours corresponding to one month. Hence, p is determined as 720, 405 and 315 
for  all,  off-peak  and  peak  hours  respectively.  We  computed  all  the  test  statistics  up  to 
maximum lag length p. Table 4 summarizes the results for some chosen lags
10. 
Table 4 Linear Granger Causality Tests  
I.  All Hours 
  X does not Granger cause P  M does not Granger cause P 
Lag p  Wald  p value A Wald p value Wald  p value A Wald p value 
50   85.850  0.001  85.203  0.001  296.030  0.000  289.916  0.000 
100  114.434  0.153  114.335  0.155  346.297  0.000  344.192  0.000 
150  168.389  0.145  168.715  0.141  382.181  0.000  383.977  0.000 
170*  184.848  0.206  185.145  0.202  392.781  0.000  394.007  0.000 
200  218.239  0.179  217.888  0.183  426.224  0.000  426.303  0.000 
300  304.801  0.412  303.758  0.429  542.195  0.000  542.657  0.000 
400  393.182  0.587  393.180  0.573  622.389  0.000  622.242  0.000 
500  501.528  0.472  501.990  0.467  752.187  0.000  751.440  0.000 
600  611.195  0.378  608.415  0.397  861.877  0.000  862.672  0.000 
700  735.909  0.168  731.817  0.196  982.413  0.000  980.930  0.000 
720 (Max) 753.840  0.185  750.852  0.199 1000.807  0.000  996.368  0.000 
 
 
                                                              
10 The complete results, code and data are available upon request. To compute the tests statistics we run Matlab 
codes using Matlab 7.9 64-bit version in an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5570 @ 2.93GHz  and 3.14 GHz, 16 GB of 
RAM machine. Given the huge matrix operations, due to the highly large data set used, involving in the 
calculations the codes would not be able to be run in a less qualified machine unless a smaller data set used. 15 
 
II. Off Peak Hours 
  X does not Granger cause P  M does not Granger cause P 
Lag p  Wald  p value A Wald p value Wald  p value A Wald p value 
50  103.756  0.000  102.070  0.000 209.313  0.000  203.454  0.000 
100  169.801  0.000  167.956  0.000 202.933  0.000  202.534  0.000 
150  221.778  0.000  221.110  0.000 261.835  0.000  260.328  0.000 
196*  274.980  0.0001  274.991  0.0001 324.487  0.000  324.957  0.000 
200  278.317  0.000  281.056  0.000 329.892  0.000  328.321  0.000 
300  387.510  0.000  387.984  0.000 400.714  0.000  400.760  0.000 
400  483.049  0.003  478.064  0.004 506.838  0.000  505.927  0.000 
405 (Max) 491.277  0.002  483.075  0.004 509.622  0.000  507.398  0.000 
 
III.  Peak Hours 
  X does not Granger cause P  M does not Granger cause P 
Lag p  Wald  p value  A Wald  p value  Wald  p value  A Wald  p value 
50  74.445  0.014  74.024  0.015  157.235  0.000  153.056  0.000 
65*  89.895  0.022  90.766  0.019  202.484  0.000  205.293  0.000 
100  126.754  0.037  126.952  0.036  235.249  0.000  234.927  0.000 
150  179.211  0.052  178.936  0.054  287.205  0.000  286.939  0.000 
200  229.403  0.075  230.011  0.072  325.765  0.000  325.794  0.000 
300  342.559  0.046  339.820  0.056  498.463  0.000  496.974  0.000 
315 (Max)  363.475  0.031  361.951  0.032  514.898  0.000  514.736  0.000 
 ote: Wald tests are calculated as their likelihood ratio (LR) equivalents by using
* 2(ln ln ) L L − , where 
* L  and 
L  represent the unconstrained and the constrained maximum log likelihood respectively. These test statistics 
are asymptotically distributed as  ( ) g χ  under the null hypotheses, where n  is the number of restrictions. The 
lag length chosen by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is indicated by *. 
 
In all-hours data, the null hypothesis of Granger-non causality, while it can be rejected for 
relatively small lags, cannot be rejected for most of the lags. After p = 71 and p=94 (not 
reported in the table) all tests indicate non rejection at 1 and 5 percent significance levels. On 
the other hand the usage of AIC, for which p is chosen as being equal to 170, indicates that  
export prices do not granger cause to power prices. Similarly, for peak hours at 5 percent 
significance level most of the tests statistics points out granger non-causality as well as the 
statistics selected by AIC. However, for off-peak hours all tests reject the non-causality. Note 
also that both Wald and A-Wald tests conclude in the same direction. 
Contrary to the export case, Granger-causality tests unambiguously reject the null hypothesis 
of no causality from imports to power prices for all cases and all tests. Hence, we obtain 16 
 
conclusive  evidence  on  causality  running  from  imports  to  power  prices  but  not  for  the 
causality from exports to power prices. 
 
3.3   Robustness using  onparametric Model 
We extend our analysis by running recently developed nonlinear tests. While the parametric 
approach we employed in Section 3.2 is appealing due to its simplicity, the tests statistics are 
only sensitive to causality in conditional mean and may not be sufficient to detect nonlinear 
effects on the conditional distribution. Baek and Brock (1992) explain that parametric linear 
causality tests have low estimation power against certain nonlinear alternatives. For testing 
causality,  nonlinear  nonparametric  techniques  seem  to  be  attractive  since  they  focus  on 
prediction without imposing a certain functional form. Various nonparametric tests have been 
proposed in the literature. Perhaps, the most influential one is developed by Hiemstra and 
Jones (1994) (HJ, henceforth). HJ test is a modified version of Baek and Brock (1992) test. 
Dijks and Panchenko (2005, 2006), DP hereafter, show that the relationship tested by HJ test 
is not generally compatible  with Granger causality,  leading to the possibility of  spurious 
rejections of the null hypothesis. As an alternative, DP developed a new test statistic that 
overcomes these limitations. 
To test the nonlinear causality between  t P and  t X , and  t P and  t M , we use both HJ and DP’s 
tests. These tests are applied to the estimated residual series from the VAR model, 
p
t u  , 
x
t u , 
m
t u , where the last two terms refer to the residuals estimated from the export and import 
equations of the VAR model, similar to the price equation depicted above. By removing 
linear predictive power, if any, with a linear VAR model, any remaining predictive power of 
residual series can be considered nonlinear predictive power.  
By definition, 
x
t u  (or 
m
t u ) strictly Granger causes of 
p
t u  if past and current values of 
x
t u  
contain additional information on future values of 
x
t u  that is not contained in the past and 
current 
p
t u   values  alone.  More  formally,  let  ( ) 1 ,...,
x
x x x
t t t l u u − − = u   and  ( ) 1 ,...,
p
p p p
t t t l u u − − = u , 
( ) , 1 x p l l ≥  denote the  information  sets consisting past  observations of 
x
t u  and 
p
t u   up and 
including time t. Let “￿ ” denote equivalence in distribution. Then 
x
t u  does not Granger cause 
of 
p
t u  if 17 
 
(2)    ( ) 0 1 1 :    | , |
p x p p p
t t t t t H u u + + u u u ￿  
 
This is a more general setup for testing Granger non-causality than the above linear case 
since  it  does  not  involve  assumptions  on  the  data  generation  process  and  the  test  of 
noncausility simply consists of comparing one-step-ahead conditional distribution of 
p
t u with 
and without past and current observed values of 
x
t u .  
The HJ and DP’s Tn tests applied to residuals of the linear VARs chosen by AIC as indicated 
in Table 3 above. The null hypothesis of conditional independence is tested using lags of the 
VAR residuals
11 in conditioning set, which is set to 8 as the maximum.  
As in the linear case, the evidence on causality from import volumes to power prices is highly 
conclusive.  Results  are presented  in  Table  5.  The  null  of  (nonlinear)  non  causality  from 
import to prices are unambiguously rejected by all tests for all, peak, and off-peak hours data. 
However, similar to linear case, the evidence on causality from export volumes to power 
prices differ across the data considered in the analysis.  Non causality from export to prices is 
unambiguously accepted by all tests in peak hours. However, for all and off-peak hours the 
results are mixed and vary between HJ and DP’s test as well as between different lags used in 
the  analysis.  Therefore,  overall,  we  obtain  similar  results  with  linear  tests  that  the 
noncausality from exports to prices can only be accepted for peak and, to some degree, for all 
hours but not for off-peak hours. 
 
Table 5.  onlinear Causality Test 
I.  All Hours 
  X does not Granger cause to P M does not Granger cause to P 
lx=ly HJ  p value  DP  p value  HJ  p value  DP  p value 
1  0.100  0.460  -0.001  0.500  82.936  0.000  10.892  0.000 
2  0.597  0.275  0.089  0.465  91.415  0.000  12.136  0.000 
3  2.597  0.005  0.389  0.349  90.025  0.000  11.892  0.000 
4  0.069  0.473  0.066  0.474  78.165  0.000  10.252  0.000 
5  3.399  0.000  0.528  0.299  68.841  0.000  9.011  0.000 
6  6.176  0.000  0.876  0.190  57.618  0.000  7.499  0.000 
7  5.858  0.000  0.797  0.213  51.098  0.000  6.635  0.000 
8  13.355  0.000  1.753  0.040  48.809  0.000  6.269  0.000 
 
                                                              
11 The C code has been provided by Diks and Panchenko. 18 
 
II. Off Peak Hours 
  X does not granger to P  M does not granger to P 
lx=ly HJ  p value DP  p value HJ  p value DP  p value 
1 3.574  0.000 0.477  0.000  9.799  0.000  9.584  0.000 
2 3.731  0.000 0.665  0.000 10.201  0.000 10.005  0.000 
3 2.967  0.002 0.939  0.002  8.562  0.000  8.348  0.000 
4 1.237  0.108 0.214  0.112  6.306  0.000  6.117  0.000 
5 0.271  0.393 0.252  0.400  4.249  0.000  4.089  0.000 
6 -0.288  0.613 -0.308  0.621  3.099  0.001  2.972  0.001 
7 0.047  0.481 0.020  0.492  3.117  0.001  2.984  0.001 
8 0.821  0.206 0.776  0.219  3.320  0.000  3.137  0.001 
III.  Peak Hours 
  X does not granger to P  M does not granger to P 
lx=ly  HJ  p value  DP  p value  HJ  p value  DP  p value 
1  -0.966  0.833  -1.002  0.842  6.206  0.000  6.112  0.000 
2  -1.899  0.971  -1.949  0.974  6.766  0.000  6.729  0.000 
3  -1.621  0.947  -1.650  0.951  7.077  0.000  7.022  0.000 
4  -1.147  0.874  -1.167  0.878  7.281  0.000  7.210  0.000 
5  -0.310  0.622  -0.293  0.615  7.841  0.000  7.750  0.000 
6  -0.594  0.724  -0.617  0.732  7.919  0.000  7.759  0.000 
7  -0.905  0.817  -0.946  0.828  6.919  0.000  6.705  0.000 
8  -0.959  0.831  -1.003  0.842  5.862  0.000  5.658  0.000 
 ote: T ratios for HJ and DP tests for the bandwidth value of 1.5, the value used by Hiemstra and Jones (1994). 
lx,ly refer to the lags of the variables in the conditioning set. 
 
Consequently, the results of granger causality tests (both linear and nonlinear) indicate that 
while  there  is  ample  evidence  for  the  hypothesis  of  import  having  a  causal  (linear  and 
nonlinear) impact on prices, the evidence for exports is ambiguous and depend on the hours 
of the day. For off peak hours there seems to be an effect exerted on prices from exports. 
While, when the demand is high in peak hours exports cannot be able to affect prices, this 
effect can enable to manifest itself when the demand is low in off peak hours. The result can 
be easily seen as ambiguous when these two data sets join together in all hours. 
 
We  next  explain  why  exports  may  not  cause  prices  in  general.    In  Ontario  exports  are 
scheduled one hour before the dispatch, and performed in the expectation that the market 
supply  is  enough  to  cover  local  demand.  Given  that the  home market  supply  security  is 
attained, and the neighbouring jurisdiction price is above the local production cost and the 
home market prices, export transactions are carried out. In this case, clearly we do not expect 19 
 
exports to affect home market prices. On the other hand, the IESO can intervene into export 
schedules when the home supply conditions are tight or when some home generators fail to 
deliver the scheduled power. Should this case occur, exports are cancelled to increase local 
market  supply.  Hence,  the  supply  increase  may  burst  the  possible  price  spikes.  These 
opposing effects, on average, can balance each other and cause no direct effect on prices. 
Indeed, this becomes clear in the test statistics. 
In contrast, imports influence prices due to several reasons. First, it is clear that  the  last 
accepted bid clearing hour-ahead pre-dispatch scheduling can come from a local generator or 
a generator from other market via imports. Therefore, the pre-dispatch prices and scheduled 
imports in  the  hour-ahead planning  can  affect the market clearing prices in the real-time 
uniform-price auction.  Second, imports are additional sources of supply, hence can increase 
supply  schedule.  Therefore,  we  expect  causality  from  imports  to  prices  and  empirical 
evidence obtained above is in line with this expectation. 
 
4.  The Relationship between Imports and Prices 
In the above analysis we concluded that there is a causal relationship between prices and 
imports but not so for exports to a large extend. In this section we quantify this relationship. 
To do so, we estimate the long-run solution of Equation (1), which can be interpreted as the 
Ontario supply curve, when exports are excluded from the relation. 
(3)  ' ' ' '
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                                         Table 6. Impact of Imports on Price 
Variables  All  Peak  Off-Peak 
Constant  
(0.000) 54.684 −  
(0.000) 57.062 −  
(0.000) 23.112 −  
Trend 
(0.037) 0.0007 −  
(0.047) 0.0002 −  









 ote: The p-values, derived from the standard errors computed by delta method, are given below in the 
parentheses. The lag length, p, in the underlying Equation (1) is chosen by AIC. The results from the lag length 
selected by SBC or HQC are qualitatively the same. 
In all these equations imports affect prices positively with significant coefficients. For all 
hours, one percent increase in imports leads to 0.009 percent increase in prices, in the long-
term when all the other variables stay constant. Similarly, this long-run effect of imports on 
prices is estimated at 0.011 and 0.007 for peak and off-peak data, respectively. Note also that 
these  magnitudes  are  larger  than  the  corresponding  estimates  of  equilibrium  quantity 
demanded  coefficient  indicating  that,  the  largest  percentage  impact  on equilibrium  prices 
results  from  imports  rather  than  the  equilibrium  quantity  demanded  or  exports  in  our 
estimates. 
We cannot directly observe the reasons behind the positive effect of imports on prices due to 
the complexity of the electricity flow in the network and data limitations. For instance, it may 
happen  that  simultaneously  Ontario  is  exporting  to  and  importing  from  New  York.  This 
simultaneous  import  and  export  by  a  market  participant  is  called  “a  wheeling  through 
transaction” in which the market participant (e.g., generation owner) moves energy through 
the Ontario grid and into another jurisdiction.
12 This type of transaction is mainly done for 
hedging purpose to minimize the market price risk exposure. However, we provide several 
plausible reasons for the positive relationship between imports and prices.  When the system 
is in stress, that is either supply conditions are tight (e.g. due to unscheduled outages) or 
demand increases suddenly and unexpectedly (e.g. due to the temperature increase), and/or 
when the power producers exercise market power and withhold capacities from production 
(indeed, as we explain in the following section, capacity utilization rates are low during trade 
                                                              
12 See the economic dispatch of linked wheel transaction at  www.ieso.com/imoweb/consult/consult_se45.asp 21 
 
activities), price increases in the auction until the unmet demand is served by high-priced 
offers. These increasing prices in the auction signal that in the upcoming auctions (for the 
following  hours)  the  prices  will  rise  unless  the  supply  and/or  demand  conditions  turn  to 
normal.  Alternatively,  the  auctioneer/system  operator  could  announce  that  supply  is  in 
shortage and  imports  must  be scheduled and they  would be  given  price guarantees, as  it 
happens  in  Ontario.  These  extra  offers  can  come  from  imports  or  expensive  spinning 
reserves. Prices can increase, even though imports are coming, because these imports may not 
be  sufficient  to  render  excess  supply  or  restore  the  imbalance  in  supply  and  demand 
differential.  Therefore,  a  positive  relationship  between  imports  and  market  prices  can  be 
observed.  
In the following section we examine the main trading partners of Ontario and their impact on 
the Ontario prices.  
 
5.  Trade Patterns between Ontario and  eighbouring Jurisdictions   
To  determine the effect  of imports from  neighbouring markets  on Ontario prices we use 
disaggregated data of imports. The disaggregated imports are only available for a limited 
period of time in our data set, which consists of imports from 12 neighbouring markets, for 
the period between May 1, 2002 and December 09, 2003
13.These regions are Manitoba (MB), 
Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), New York (NY), and eight trading zones in Quebec (which 
are called PQBE, PQDA, PQDZ, PQHA, PQHZ, PQPC, PQQC, PQXY).  
Table  7  provides  some  descriptive  statistics  on  the  12  interties  that  Ontario  has  with  its 
neighbours. It can be seen that on average Ontario trades a lot with Michigan and New York, 
mostly importing from them. Although there are a lot of connections with Quebec (the 8 
interties  starting  with  “PQ”),  relatively  little  trade  takes  place.  Only  one  intertie,  PQBE, 
through which Ontario exports to Quebec on average more than 300 MW during its export 
hours, and imports more than 338 MW during its import hours. The intertie PQPC is also a 
source of imports for Ontario, with an average of 170 MW coming every hour from Quebec. 
All other interties with Quebec are relatively less important. 
                                                              
13 We still have 14,112 observations in total (about 20 months). 22 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of Ontario intertie, May 1, 2002 to Dec. 9, 2003 
    MB  MI  MN  NY  PQBE  PQDA 
Average Hourly 
Trade (MWh) 
Export  56.2  315.6  50.1  483.3  302.5  71.0 
Import  -172.3  -521.9  -59.6  -499.4  -338.4  -70.7 
 umber of 
Hours of … 
Export  1,289  3,047   3,296   6,570   1,766   4,031  
Import  12,796   10,988   10,197   7,535   2,042   4,363  
Maximum Value 
(MWh) 
Export   237   1,366   152   1,700   432   98  
Import  -296  -1,441  -98  -1,992  -851  -194 
               
    PQDZ  PQHA  PQHZ  PQPC  PQQC  PQXY 
Average Hourly 
Trade (MWh) 
Export  1.0     32.4  1.7  60.6    
Import  -32.6  -85.1  -7.6  -170.0  -26.2  -27.7 
 umber of 
Hours of … 
Export  2   -  11,023   13   7,882   - 
Import  575   147   2,504   1,233   11   966  
Maximum Value 
(MWh) 
Export  1   -  98   5   123   - 
Import  -74  -104  -46  -315  -48  -58 
 
We re-estimate equation (3) by using disaggregated import data, for all, peak and off-peak 
hours and summarize the results in Table 8 below. 
Table 8. Impact of Imports on Price, by Intertie 
Variables  All  Peak  Off Peak   
Constant 
(0.000) 77.424 −  
(0.000) 115.557 −  









(0.000) 0.005    Variables  All  Peak  Off Peak 
Manitoba 
( 0.307) 0.025 
(0.098) 0.063 
(0.419) 0.014    PQDZ 
(0.646) 0.152 





(0.000) 0.015    PQHA 






(0.753) 0.013    PQHZ 
(0.026) 1.214 −  
(0.027) 1.539 −  









(0.290) 0.025 −  
(0.932) 0.002 
(0.102) 0.031 −     PQQC 
(0.305) 3.676  - 
(0.949) 0.088 −  
PQDA 
(0.387) 0.047 −  
(0.617) 0.030 −  
(0.641) 0.024 −     PQXY 
(0.172) 0.376 −  
(0.394) 0.287 −  
(0.369) 0.224 −  
 ote: The p-values, derived from the standard errors computed by delta method, are given below in the 
parentheses. The lag length, p, in the underlying Equation (1) is chosen by AIC.  
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Note  that,  since  there  is  no  import  from  PQQC  in  peak  hours  it  is  omitted  from  the 
corresponding regression. There are not many differences between the above equations and 
those obtained with aggregated import data in terms of the estimates of the coefficient of total 
demand variable (Q). In all equations the coefficient is highly significant and remains within 
the same magnitudes as those of aggregated data. On the other hand, not all the imports seem 
to exert significant effects on prices. For instance, in all data estimation, while the imports 
from Michigan, New York, PQHZ markets have significant effects on prices, those of others 
do not appear to be significant. For off peak data, we have only Michigan and New York
14, 
whereas for the peak data, we have Manitoba (at 10 percent level), New York and PQHZ as 
being significant. Notice also that the effect of PQHZ on prices is negative, while the others 
and aggregate imports are affecting prices positively. This negatively signed effect has also 
higher impact on prices as its magnitude indicates. 
  
As we explain in Section 4, positive impacts of imports on prices can stem from tight demand 
and/or  supply  conditions  during  which  the  auctioneer  announces  high  prices  to  meet  the 
demand. Increase in imports does not translate to increase in supply curve but into quantity 
supplied stemming from increase in imports as market prices rise. On the other hand, imports 
affecting prices negatively can also happen due to the technological differences. In some 
periods, instead of using scheduled high cost generators it can be cheaper to import from 
regions in which they generate power using their low cost base-load generators. In this case, 
imports  can  lower  the  market  prices.  This  happens  usually  when  there  is  excess  supply, 
and/or when demand is low (or when there is excess capacity in the market).  
We  have  obtained  hourly  capacity  utilization  (the  ratio  of  total  output  to  total  available 
capacity)  data  for  coal,  hydro,  nuclear,  wind  and  other  (fossil-fuel-fired)  production 
technologies in the Ontario market for the years 2006-2008 in total of 132360 observations. 
The average hourly capacity utilizations for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 are 56%, 59.2%, 
and 53.5%, respectively. The highest capacity utilization occurs in the months of January, 
February and March with the rates 63%, 64%, and 59% in year 2006; with 61%, 67% and 
65% in year 2007; and with 60%, 60%, and 61% in year 2008, respectively. The lowest 
utilization varies over years. In most of the hours capacity utilization by nuclear producers, 
which  provide  the  base-load,  are  close  to  hundred  percent.  The  second  largest  capacity 
utilization comes from hydro producers and the third largest utilization is due to the coal-fired 
                                                              
14 PQBE, a trading zone in Quebec, is just missing to be significant at 10 percent with a p-value being equal to 
0.102. 24 
 
generators. The lowest capacity utilization comes from wind turbines in which the variation 
of production is rather seasonal. Although capacity utilization rates are low, that is to say 
production capacity constraints are almost never binding; imports are scheduled from other 
jurisdictions into Ontario. For example, the maximum import quantity from New York is 
1992 MWh, and it is 1441 MWh from Michigan, as Table 7 indicates.
15 On the other hand, 
the maximum export quantity is 1700 MWh to New York. The export quantity is part of the 
total demand (Ontario demand plus exports), and the capacity utilization numbers presented 
above already take into account of exports. Then, an interesting question arises: why import 
quantities are high given the low capacity utilization rates. As we find positive relationship 
between imports and market prices, low capacity utilization rates may  confirm that trade 
activities could be used to exercise market power. A policy recommendation of this finding is 
that the system operators and/or regulators should scrutinize the trade transactions to check 




As electricity markets reform and open access transmission interconnects increasingly large 
territories,  it  becomes  more  and  more  important  to  understand  how  imports  and  exports 
influence local market prices. Due to the characteristics of electricity markets (such as non-
storability, continuous match of demand and supply, transmission network constraints, and 
constantly changing demand and supply conditions), it is a challenging task to develop a 
general international or interregional electricity trade theory. It can happen that electricity is 
exported from a high price market to a low price market; for instance, during an off-peak 
time New York exporters may sell electricity to a low price Quebec market. This benefits 
both jurisdictions because New York exporters can recover their marginal production costs 
and Quebec importers avoid using power units with high start-up costs or simply save hydro 
resources for higher priced time periods. Also, in electricity markets simultaneous exports 
and imports, called wheeling through transactions, are possible.  That is, even though prices 
are different in both markets a market participant can export electricity to another market and 
import into the home market at the same time. These factors complicate modelling trade 
                                                              
15 These maximum imports quantities are a bit different than the import capacities reported in Table 2, as they 
represent the capacities only in year 2009.  25 
 
behaviour  among  electricity  markets/jurisdictions  and  estimating  trade  effects  on  market 
prices.  
We employ an econometric approach to analyze the trade activities between Ontario and its 
neighbouring  jurisdictions  in  the  network,  and find  that  while  Ontario exports  cannot  be 
unambiguously  tied  to  the  hourly  Ontario  energy  prices,  imports  can.  We  have  shown 
Granger causality for all lags in the case of imports, with linear and non-linear tests. 
Our intertie analysis shows that imports from two lines have a significant impact on prices, 
while other lines have little or no impact. These two lines (interties with Michigan and New 
York) are the busiest in terms of trade, so this result in not surprising. This paper, by making 
use of an extensive database, provides unique evidence that imports have an influence on 
price on a hourly basis, even if only a limited number of intertie have a significant impact. In 
the aggregate data we observe positive relationship between imports and prices. When we 
disaggregate imports and account for the role of each market on Ontario prices we observe 
mixed results. The imports from Michigan and New York increase the Ontario prices most of 
the  time  during  trading  periods.  However,  interties  in  Quebec  may  help  reduce  Ontario 
prices.  Production  technology  differences  could  explain  the  sign  of  relationship  between 
prices  and  imports.  Quebec  has  low-cost  hydro  facilities  that  accounts  for  97%  installed 
production  capacity  which  may  substitute  Ontario’s  high-cost  fossil  fuel  fired  generators 
through imports. On the other hand, the price setting major power generators in New York 
and Michigan markets are mainly fossil fuel fired which can increase Ontario prices when the 
demand is high in the Ontario market.  
To fully grasp the network interactions and trade impacts on market price, more investigation 
is  still  required.  Using  additional  empirical  data  sources  (such  as  local  loads,  network 
constraints data, and possibly other explanatory variables, such as temperature), as well as 
firm-level data, could be helpful to provide an analysis for further insights. A trade analysis 
incorporating such data is a future research direction one may consider. However, some of 
the data required, especially firm level data, is confidential and unavailable to public in many 
jurisdictions.  
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All Hours (62,328 observations) 
Mean  1,027.302  1,288.290  17,311.412  51.359 
Median  1,008.00  1,216.000  17,448.000  43.360 
Standard Deviation  609.782  864.660  2,628.485  33.907 
Skewness  0.668  0.855  0.107  7.217 
Kurtosis  0.759  1.193  -0.331  209.425 
Peak Hours: 8:00 to 22:59 (27,825 observations) 
Mean  1,097.326  1,153.252  19,268.489  65.101 
Median  1,044.000  996.000  19,069.000  58.210 
Standard Deviation  680.443  914.886  1,869.812  39.509 
Skewness  0.690  1.180  0.257  8.818 
Kurtosis  0.532  1.716  1.744  238.984 
Off Peak Hours: 23:00 to 7:59 (34,503 observations) 
Mean  970.831  1,397.191  15,733.125  40.277 
Median  985.000  1,376.000  15,603.000  36.220 
Standard Deviation  539.610  805.614  2,020.234  23.301 
Skewness  0.441  0.635  0.342  2.776 
Kurtosis  0.283  1.031  -0.192  21.907 
 
 